Williams and Utilitarianism

In his critique of Utilitarianism, Williams finds fault in the Utilitarian commitment to maximum utility in that it undermines the integrity of moral agents and denies people the projects and relationships they inherently value. Famously known as his â€Å"Integrity Objection†, this proposition is immediately very enticing in that it appeals to the idea of the invaluable and imperative nature of benevolence and compassion, versus the cold, impartial hand of Utilitarianism. That is not to say, however, that Utilitarians have been dealt a hefty criticism from which they have no defense.While Williams may be correct in claiming that abandoning commitments or devaluing personal relationships may be counterintuitive, a Utilitarian could argue that his construction of â€Å"integrity† is equally counterintuitive in that it would require one to override their intrinsic pursuit of self- preservation. Additionally, if we were to presuppose Williams’ correctness, a Utilita rian could argue that the only plausible implementation of such a theory would mean valuing these emotional engagements above one’s own agency, a scenario even more demanding and sacrificial of one’s identity than the Utilitarian proposal.Williams directs this objection specifically toward Act-Utilitarianism, a branch of Utilitarian thought that deems the morally correct action as the one that produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. He claims that such a theory is incompatible with the aspect of human happiness that is found in the commitment to personal projects and relationships: â€Å"Utilitarianism would do well then to acknowledge the evident fact that among the things that make people happy is not only making other people happy, but being taken up or involved in any of a vast range of projects. 1 While Utilitarians actually need lower order projects comprised of relationships and commitments in order to validate their higher order projects, the lower order projects will always serve the concerns of the first order. In turn, Williams asserts that such a compromise of emotional engagements for maximum utility usurps one’s sense of self, consequently marring the distinction between one’s commitment and one’s identity: â€Å"(†¦ ) that criterion would eliminate any desire at all which was not blankly and in the most straightforward sense egoistic.Thus we should be reduced to frankly egoistic first-order projects, and- for all essential purposes- the one second-order utilitarian project of maximally satisfying first-order projects. †2Abandoning certain commitments for the sake of another project can be acceptable, but when forced to relinquish those which a person deeply values, Williams argues they are robbed of â€Å"a sense of one’s moral identity† or what he describes as one’s integrity.Williams offers us two scenarios to further exemplify his theory: â€Å"Jim†, who is told by the edicts of utilitarianism to murder one innocent Amazon Indian in order to prevent twenty more being murdered, and â€Å"George†, a chemist who is (also by the parameters of Utilitarianism) forced to take a job creating weapons of mass destruction, since the balance-sheet of utilities shows that if George refuses, a far younger, more zealous chemist will carry the project along even further and more efficiently than George.While these scenarios may seem like far-fetched constructions meant to reveal Utilitarianism pursuing the wrong choice, Williams conversely (perhaps begrudgingly) admits that these would be the â€Å"right† choices for the given circumstances. The true problem, he argues, is 1? CITATION? 112? 2? CITATION? 113? ? hat the emphasis should not simply be on the â€Å"rightness† of the action but the considerations involved in reaching that conclusion. This is a feature of Utilitarianism Williams claims â€Å" cuts out a consideration which for some others makes a difference to what they feel about such cases†. 3 He continues to explain that excluding such considerations denies our sense of personal accountability for our own actions and in turn â€Å"makes integrity as a value more or less intelligible†. In sum, if we were to reduce William’s entire integrity objection to its most salient points, they would be the following: the emotional commitments that are incompatible with the parameters of Act- Utilitarianism are not only impossible to abandon entirely but are an integral facet of human happiness, therefore creating a dilemma for the Utilitarian in that they must allow for it. The potential defense of a Utilitarian to Williams’ objection begins with the examination of his construction of integrity, which he seems to define as one’s â€Å"sense of self†.Looking simply at this definition alone, it could be said that subjectivity suggested with this variety of integrity incorrectly presupposes that a person’s sense of their identity is always correct. Utilitarianism could make a claim for the value in assessing reality with the sort of impartiality that Williams’ rejects, seeing as if one is not being appraised objectively, their sense of self is entirely contingent on their own conception.More importantly, and the crux of the Utilitarian defense, is that while Williams’ is correct in his claim that abandoning these emotional entanglements is counterintuitive, maintaining such commitments are at odds with the human desire for self-preservation, a 3? CITATION? p99? 4? CITATION? p99? ? conflict that Utilitarianism not only recognizes but Williams does not offer any viable solution for.Based on his examples and criticisms of Utilitarianism, it could be inferred that Williams assumes that we have a moral obligation to help others in a time of crisis, that one has an inherent responsibility to compassion a nd benevolence. This is clearly in conflict with the Utilitarian theory that one’s responsibility is to maximum utility, so even if the Utilitarian were to concede to Williams objection, it would be implausible to imagine a scenario in which the two could be regarded as being of equal value.In turn, the only option available to maintaining this ethos of selflessness would be to regard it as superior to maximum utility. This, a Utilitarian could argue, could prove to be extremely problematic. Firstly, it is extremely unrealistic to assume that people have the capacity to function entirely out of selflessness. Even though benevolence and emotional attachment can provide a certain level of happiness and fulfillment to a person, the expectation to unilaterally value the welfare of others over our own is not only implausible but ultimately self-defeating.Abandoning or betraying commitments in order to further advance a larger more important agenda certainly isn’t an idea pa rticular to Utilitarianism. A quick browse of a history textbook would support that, by and large, humans are inherently self-serving and while one may commit to an act, cause or person, it does not necessarily mean that they themselves aren’t using such relationships for their own agency. Utilitarianism may require that a person abandon a particular commitment for the sake of the reater good, but it can certainly be said that in the absence of utilitarianism, the commitment could be abandoned anyway, except in this case it would be for a self-serving purpose. A Utilitarian could potentially argue that their moral theory simply recognizes and curbs the inwardly focused desires of mankind and attempts to redirect such motivation toward the greater good. One could argue that Williams’ is somewhat disillusioned with mankind as he makes sweeping idealizations of the human psyche.Williams’ examples of â€Å"Jim† and â€Å"George† seem to both be conting ent on the idea that what makes said examples disconcerting is premise that both men would be acting against their conscience, in turn making the assumption that all people have consciences that should be considered. Secondly, if one could clear the hurdle of the first argument, the actual implementation of such a theory is extremely difficult. Williams argues that Utilitarianism is far too demanding to be plausible but in fact, trading this impartiality for benevolence proves to be far more exhausting.Considering the world’s current state of affairs, there are always people in dire need of help, so one calls into question exactly what parameters would be set in place in order to orchestrate such a society. What would be the stipulations of a worthy recipient of another’s benevolence? If Williams was simply talking about people’s obligation to those close to them, valuing those relationships above maximum utility creates a bias that is even more incompatible wit h benevolence than Utilitarianism, which at least works in the interest of the entire population.A Utilitarian could also argue that it simply because they are outweighed by maximum utility does not mean that substantial relationships are not valued in Utilitarianism. While they are indeed lower order projects, a Utilitarian could make an argument that it is through maintaining such relationships that the value of one’s own welfare is realized and are only outweighed by serious interests of first order projects.The analyses above reflect the same conclusion. Williams’ objection brings to light shortcomings in Utilitarianism that are easily felt by those uncomfortable with the impartial and seemingly unfeeling Utilitarian mentality. However, the arguments put forth by Williams regarding the counterintuitive and overly demanding nature of impartiality neglect the similarly inherent and insatiable desire for self-preservation.